Abstract. We present the -adic probability logic based on the paper [5] by A. Khrennikov et al. The logical language contains formulas such as = ( ) with the intended meaning "the probability of is equal to ", where is a propositional formula. We introduce a class of Kripke-like models that combine properties of the usual Kripke models and finitely additive -adic probabilities. We propose an infinitary axiom system and prove that it is sound and strongly complete with respect to the considered class of models. In the paper the terms finitary and infinitary concern the meta language only, i.e., the logical language is countable, formulas are finite, while only proofs are allowed to be infinite. We analyze decidability of and provide a procedure which decides satisfiability of a given probability formula.
Introduction
The Einsten-Podolsky-Rosen paradox and the empirical violations of Bell's inequality answered negatively the question whether quantum stochastics can be reduced to the classical stochastics and led to the belief that the roots of these paradoxes are in the mathematical foundation of Kolmogorov-style probability theory. Several non-Archimedean approaches are introduced in order to develop a probability theory suitable for applications in mathematical physics.
One of the noteworthy attempts to overcome these obstacles are -adic valued probabilities. The measure-theoretical -adic probability is of the utmost importance for this paper and its details can be found in [4] and [5] . Also, for the basic facts about -adic numbers an interested reader can consult [1] and [8] .
In this paper, for the -adic probability logic are introduced syntax, the corresponding class of models and the infinitary axiomatization, which is proved to be sound and strongly complete with respect to the mentioned class of models. An algorithm which decides satisfiability of a given -adic probability formula is presented too.
The significance of logic is comparable to the importance of Hailperin's propositional probability logic and logic 2 , exposed in [2] and [6] , respectively, in the classical probability framework.
Syntax
Let be a fixed prime natural number and be the set of all -adic integers which are algebraic over Q, i.e., = Q alg ∩ Z . The language of the -adic probability logic consists of a denumerable set of propositional variables Var = { 1 , 2 , . . .}, logical connectives ∧ and ¬ , and probability operators = for each ∈ . The set of all propositional formulas is denoted by For and its elements by , , . Probability operators are applied to propositional formulas and in that way basic probability formulas = are obtained. All Boolean combinations of basic probabilistic formulas form the set For with the elements , , . The set For of −formulas is a disjoint union of For and For and its elements are denoted by Φ, Ψ, Θ. ∧ = ( ), = ( = ( )) / ∈ For because the above formation rules do not allow neither mixing of propositional and probabilistic formulas nor nesting of probabilistic operators.
Semantics
A class of subsets of a nonempty set is an algebra if it contains and is closed under finite unions and complementation. A finitely additive -adic probability measure is a function : → Q with the following properties:
, for all disjoint sets 1 , 2 ∈ , and ‖ ‖ = sup{‖ ( )‖ | ∈ , ⊆ } < ∞. These properties correspond, respectively, to normalization, additivity and boundedness in [4] and [5] .
Semantics to the set of -formulas is given in the possible-world style.
Definition 3.
1. An -model is a structure = ⟨ , , , ⟩ where:
− is a nonempty set of objects called worlds; − associates a valuation of variables ( ) with each world ∈ , i.e., ( ) : Var → {0, 1}, − is an algebra of subsets of , − : → is a finitely additive -adic probability measure on .
The class of all -models with the property that for every ∈ For , [ ] = { ∈ | } is a measurable set, i.e., [ ] ∈ , will be denoted by
Meas . This class of models will be in the scope of our research. 
Axioms
The axiomatic system for contains the following axiom schemata:
Axiom 1: all the axioms of the classical propositional logic, separately for formulas from For and separately for formulas from For , Axiom 2: 
Axiom 1 and Rule 1 correspond to the classical propositional reasoning. Axioms 2-5 concern the probabilistic part of our system. Axiom 4 corresponds to the finite additivity of measure. Rule 2 is a form of modal necessitation and secures normalization of the measure, while infinitary Rule 3, which first was introduced in [7] , guarantees that to each formula is attached a probability.
Definition 4.1. Φ ∈ For is deducible from the theory , which we denote by ⊢ Φ, if there exists a denumerable sequence of formulas Φ 0 , Φ 1 , . . . , Φ called the proof, such that each member of the sequence is an instance of some axiom schemata or is contained in , or is obtained from the previous formulas using an inference rule. Formula Ψ ∈ For is a theorem (denoted by ⊢ Ψ) if it is deducible from the empty set.
Definition 4.2. A theory
is consistent if there are at least one formula from For and at least one formula from For which can not be deduced from . A theory is maximal consistent if it is consistent and fulfills the following two conditions:
− for each ∈ For , if ⊢ , then ∈ and =1 ( ) ∈ , − for each ∈ For , either ∈ or ¬ ∈ . The set of all formulas which are deducible from is called the deductive closure of and denoted by ( ). A theory is deductively closed if = ( ).
Soundness and completeness
This section begins with proofs of Soundness and Deduction theorem for the -adic probability logic .
Theorem 5.1 (Soundness). The axiomatic system is sound with respect to the class of
Meas -models.
Proof. The soundness of propositional logic implies that every instance of an axiom schemata for propositional formula holds in every model and that the inference rule R1 preserves validity. We will prove validity of the axiom A4 and the similar reasoning can be applied to the other axioms. Let Proof. If Φ, Ψ ∈ For , then this is the well-known Deduction theorem for propositional logic since there is no rule whose antecedents are formulas from For and the consequent is in For .
We use the transfinite induction on the length of the proof of Ψ from ∪{Φ} to prove the implication from left to right for Φ, Ψ ∈ For . The other direction and the cases when either ⊢ Ψ or Φ = Ψ or Ψ is obtained by Rule 1 can be proved in the same way as in the classical propositional calculus. If Ψ is of the form Ψ = =1 ( ), ∈ For , and Ψ is deduced from ∪ {Φ} by an application of Rule 2, then:
by Rule 1 applied on 3 and 4. If Ψ = → ⊥ is obtained from ∪ {Φ} using Rule 3, then:
1. ∪ {Φ} ⊢ → ¬ = ( ), for each ∈ 2. ⊢ Φ → ( → ¬ = ( )), for each ∈ by the induction hypothesis 3. ⊢ (Φ ∧ ) → ¬ = ( ), for ∈ , using an instance of the classical propositional tautology In order to prove the completeness theorem, we are going to show that every consistent theory can be extended to a maximal consistent theory * , and use * to construct the canonical model. We give the sketches for proofs of the preparatory lemmas.
Lemma 5.1. For every consistent theory and every ∈ For , there exists ∈ such that ∪ { = ( )} is consistent.
Proof. Suppose that there is ∈ ∩ For (if this intersection is empty we set = ⊤). Proof. Let be a consistent theory, ( ) the set of all propositional formulas which are deducible from , 1 , 2 , . . . an enumeration of all formulas from For and 1 , 2 , . . . an enumeration of all formulas from For . We construct a sequence of theories ( ) < in the following way:
for some ∈ , such that 2 +2 is a consistent theory. We notice that the existence of in the step 2 + 2 is secured by Lemma 5.1. * = ⋃︀ < is a union of consistent theories and it will be proved that * is maximal consistent. The first condition of maximality is achieved by constructing 0 , which contains the propositional deductive closure of and all corresponding formulas of the form =1 ( ). Concerning ∈ For , 2 +1 contains either = or ¬ = , but not both, because otherwise 2·max{ , }+1 would be inconsistent.
We are going to prove that * is deductively closed using the transfinite induction on the length of the proof. It will be sufficient to claim its consistency, since * does not contain all formulas. In the case of the finite proof for , there is a such that ⊢ , and, thus, ∈ * . Suppose that for = → ⊥, * ⊢ → ⊥ is obtained using the infinitary rule from → ¬ = ( ), ∈ , for some ∈ For , but → ⊥ / ∈ * . In the step 2 + 2, 2 +2 is constructed adding = ( ), where is a fixed element of . There is ∈ such that ¬( → ⊥) ∈ and ⊢ . For some > 2 + 2, , it is fulfilled 
Let
* be a maximal consistent theory in − 3 . Suppose there are 1 , 2 ∈ and ∈ For such that = 1 ( ), = 2 (¬ ) ∈ * and 2 ̸ = 1 − 1 . Since ∨ ¬ is a tautology, it is possible to conclude =1 ( ∨ ¬ ) ∈ * , according to Rule R2, and = 1 + 2 ( ∨ ¬ ) ∈ * , using an instance of A4 and the deduction theorem. The instance =1 ( ∨ ¬ ) → ¬ = 1 + 2 ( ∨ ¬ ) of A5 and the deduction theorem imply
contradicts the assumed consistency of * . Since there is no maximal consistent theory in − 3 containing ¬A3, we conclude ¬A3 ⊢ − 3 ⊥, i.e., ⊢ − 3
A3.
Let be a consistent theory and its * fixed maximal consistent extension. The canonical model = ⟨ , , , ⟩ is defined as follows: − = { : Var → 2 | ( )} and we identify ( ) with ;
Theorem 5.4. Let = ⟨ , , , ⟩ be as above and , ∈ For . Then, the following hold: a) is an algebra of subsets of ,
is an Meas -model.
Proof. a) All conditions for to be an algebra of subsets of are fulfilled:
( ) ↔ and, by the completeness of propositional calculus, ( ) ⊢ ↔ . Applying Rule 2 we obtain =1 ( ↔ ) and the statement follows by A2. f) This is a straightforward consequence of parts a)-e).
Theorem 5.5 (Extended completeness theorem for Meas ). A theory is consistent if and only if it has an
Meas -model.
Proof. The direction from right to left follows from the soundness theorem. For the other direction we consider the canonical model and prove by the induction on complexity of formulas that for each Φ ∈ For, Φ if and only if Φ ∈ * . Let Φ ∈ For . If Φ ∈ ( ), then Φ by the definition of . If Φ then ( ) Φ, and thus, by the completeness of the propositional calculus and the completeness of the propositional theory ( ), Φ ∈ ( ). It is an immediate consequence of Definition 2 that = ( ) ∈ * iff = ( ). If Φ ∈ For is of the form ¬ , then ¬ iff iff / ∈ * iff ¬ ∈ * . For Φ = ∧ ∈ For , ∧ iff and iff ∈ * and ∈ * iff ∧ ∈ * .
Decidability
Firstly, we prove that is a computable ring, which is one of the crucial facts for the proof that is decidable.
Theorem 6.1. = Q ∩ Z is a computable ring, i.e., is a decidable set, and there are algorithms which for given , ∈ compute + , · , − .
Proof. We will represent each element ∈ as a pair ( , ( , ) ), where is a polynomial with rational coefficients such that ( ) = 0, ∈ Z and ∈ N, and ( , ) = { ∈ Q | ‖ − ‖ < 1/ } is a -adic open ball containing and no other root of . Let = ( , ( 1 , 1 ) ) and = ( , ( 2 , 2 )) be two elements of , and = deg( ), = deg( ). We will sketch an algorithm which decides whether and are equal. Without loss of generality suppose that 1 2 . If ‖ 1 − 2 ‖ 1/ 1 , then ( 1 , 1 ) and ( 2 , 2 ) are disjoint, and thus ̸ = . Otherwise, we compute ℎ = GCD( , ) and two possible cases may occur:
− ℎ = 1 implies ̸ = − for ℎ ̸ = 1 we perform root isolation for ℎ and, if needed, root refinement to obtain isolating intervals of the radius − 1 (see [9] for details on these procedures); we have to check, in the same way as we did it for ( 2 , 2 ), if among these isolating intervals exists a subset of ( 1 , 1 ) ; affirmative answer implies = , and negative leads to the opposite conclusion. We are going to find a representation for + .
, where ∈ , is a linear combination of 0 , . . . , We will denote by a matrix having · + 1 rows and · columns: its -th row consists of the coefficients 
it is necessary to perform root isolation for ℎ * , and possibly root refinement for and , and find the isolation interval for ℎ * which contains 1 + 2 . (ℎ * , ) is a representation for + .
In order to find a representation for · we consider the matrix having · + 1 rows and · columns whose -th row is defined by ( · ) −1 . − can be seen as · (−1).
There is an algorithm which for given Φ ∈ For decides its satisfiability.
Proof. If the propositional formula Φ is not a contradiction, then the theory {Φ} has a model by Theorem 5.5. The decidability procedure for Φ ∈ For is based on the following steps and remarks:
− the input is a formula Φ ∈ For , − transform Φ into disjunctive normal form DNF(Φ) = Φ 1 ∨ . . . ∨ Φ with respect to the basic -adic probabilistic formulas = ( ), − Φ is satisfiable iff at least one disjunct Φ , = 1, . . . , , is satisfiable, − repeat the following procedure for each disjunct of Φ until one is satisfied or all are already checked: Φ is a conjunction of formulas
it is necessary to examine if there is any collision with axioms 2, 4 and 5, and the fact deducible by Rule 2 that each tautology has a probability 1; for example a collision with Axiom 5 means that there is a pair of formulas = ( ), = ( ) such that ̸ = and ⊢ ↔ ; if no such collision is detected, then the theory { = 1 ( 1 ) 1 , . . . , = ( ) } is consistent and, by the extended completeness theorem, has a Meas -model.
Final remarks and future work
Instead of , the previous results could be easily modified for any recursive ring or field without ordering compatible with operations. Basic probability formulas of these new logics would be = ( ), ∈ .
In [3] is mentioned the following partial ordering on Z : for = ∑︀ +∞ =0 · and = ∑︀ +∞ =0 · we set < if there exists such that < and for all > . For the purpose of this paper we alter the above ordering as follows: we set that 0 is the minimum, and for , ∈ {0}, > iff there exists such that < and for all > . This ordering has the maximum, namely it is 1, and for integers it holds: 0 < −1 < −2 < −3 < · · · < 3 < 2 < 1. Each ∈ Z is greater than any negative integer and less than any positive integer, but 1 , 2 ∈ Z are not comparable. It makes sense to say that a propositional formula with negative integer measure has a probability close to 0, while a propositional formula with positive integer measure has a probability close to 1. In such a way the zero probability is split to a set of probabilities [0, 0 + ), and the probability 1 is split to a set of probabilities (1 − , 1]. Finally, we announce papers on the following topics: − propositional -adic probability logic with iterations; − first-order -adic probability logic without iterations; − first-order -adic probability logic with iterations; − -adic probability logic and default reasoning; − -adic probability logic which corresponds to the notion of -adic proportional probability introduced in [3] − -adic probability logics with basic probability formulas of the form ( ) ∈ ( , ), where ( , ) is an open -adic ball of rational radius containing the rational number .
